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Introduction
Higher equity holding by investors causes their right of vote to have more weight-
age in shareholder meetings. In other words, those who hold many shares have a significant
impact on the company. When studying management of incorporated companies, one needs
to consider the big picture of ownership structure. Today, foreign institutional investors hold
majority of Japan’s publicly listed stocks; Japanese institutional investors hold a significant
percentage as well. And many Japanese institutional investors have signed Japan’s Steward-
ship Code. However, securities filings identify Japan Trustee Services Bank and The Master
Trust Bank of Japan as major shareholders because institutional investors often assign their
shares to trustees who provide services to their institutional clients.
The present study examines the following: How do these investors exercise voting,
and how do they have a dialogue with investee companies in order to fulfill their steward-
ship responsibility？ Who drafts the voting policy, votes on shareholder measures, and has a
dialogue when institutional investors entrust their custody？
１ This paper is based on articles originally published as Yosuke Torii,“Stewardship Responsibilities of Real
Investors and Voting Activities: Surveying Institutions That Signed Up for Japan’s Stewardship Code”, Jour-
nal of Business Management, No.３９（２０１７a）, pp.６１―７２;“Trustees as Major Shareholders and their Voting Ac-
tivities in Japan”, In Tsuneo Sakamoto and Shigeru Shoda（Eds.）, Global, Innovative and Environmental Man-
agement, Maruzen Planet（２０１７b）, pp.９８―１１２; and“Structure and Position of Trust Accounts as Major Share-
holders in Japan”, Annuals of Society for the Economic Studies of Securities, No.５１（２０１６）, pp.４９―５９.
２４１
／■修校了／１２－２８５／本文／ＡＺ２８５Ｎ 2018.03.13 14.38.54 Page 261
Figure １ Shareholding at Market Value in Japan
（Notes）１. Foreigners: Non-Japanese corporations and individuals （including foreign
trust banks）
２. The number of domestic institutional investors rose dramatically from１９８５to
１９８６because of changes in the method of totalization.
（Source）Japan Stock Exchange“２０１５Shareownership Survey”
１. History of Ownership Structure in Japan
Figure１ shows the history of ownership structure in Japan. In pre-World War II
Japan, family-run conglomerates called zaibatsu capitalized on and controlled wholly owned
business subsidiaries. After the war, Japan’s governing military headquarters dissolved all
zaibatsu. When threatened by hostile takeovers or capital liberalization, zaibatsu formed
cross-shareholdings with affiliated companies in their groups. During this period, banks were
the major shareholders and companies were affiliated with the same group; therefore, com-
panies were managed for the benefit of their groups and to gain market share.
The bursting of Japan’s economy bubble led to the plummeting of stock prices and
the dissolving of cross-shareholdings following the introduction of market-value accounting.
Foreign institutional investors bought large numbers of equities sold by banks and corpora-
tions. They have made a request shareholder return to companies and have evaluated com-
panies using an index such as return on equity（ROE）.
―― 経 営 論 集 ――２４２
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Institutional investors presently own the highest percentage of Japan’s publicly
listed stocks. However, securities filings identify Japan Trustee Services Bank, The Master
Trust Bank of Japan, and Trust & Custody Services Bank as the major shareholders（see
Figure２）. This is because institutional investors often assign their shares to trustees that
manage several tasks for their institutional clients. These institutions are called specialized
asset administration banks（SAABs）.
Who are the real investors？ Real investors include investment trusts, pension
funds, and public institutions. How do these real investors（institutional investors）affect in-
vestee companies？
Sakamoto（１９９８）regard Japanese institutional investors of the late１９９０s as instru-
ments of commercial banks.
Basically, major commercial banks determine the fund management activities of Japa-
nese institutional investors. This is because they played a leading role in regrouping
business groups dissolved by GHQ after World War II. And in insurance companies, for
example, their clients are related business group companies controlled by major com-
mercial banks. Therefore, insurance companies have to obey major commercial banks
when they invest capital raised as insurance.
During the later１９９０s, Japanese institutional investors differed from foreign institu-
tional investors, who strove to out-perform each other.
Many studies suggest poor Japanese corporate governance. Many Japanese share-
holders are regarded as stable shareholders because they do not exercise voting rights. The
doubt arises whether institutions that entrust their custody exercise their voting rights well.
―― Changes in Ownership Structure and Real Investors ―― ２４３
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Figure ２ Ten Largest Shareholders of Toyota Motor Corporation
Names
Number of shares held
（thousands of shares）
Percentage of
total（%）
Japan Trustee Services Bank, Ltd. ３５８，７９１ １０．６０
Toyota Industries Corporation ２２４，５１５ ６．６３
The Master Trust Bank of Japan, Ltd. １４９，００５ ４．４０
Nippon Life Insurance Company １２０，３９０ ３．５６
State Street Bank and Trust Company
（standing proxy: Settlement & Clearing
Services Division, Mizuho Bank, Ltd.）
１１５，２３０ ３．４０
DENSO CORPORATION ８６，５１３ ２．５６
JP Morgan Chase & Company
（standing proxy: Settlement & Clearing
Services Division, Mizuho Bank, Ltd.）
７３，４８３ ２．１７
The Bank of New York Mellon as Depositary
Bank for Depositary Receipt Holders
６６，９３３ １．９８
Trust & Custody Services Bank, Ltd. ６４，００５ １．８９
Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company, Lim-
ited.
６２，０６３ １．８３
（Note）As of March３１,２０１６.
（Source）Toyota Motor Corporation Homepage,
http:／／www.toyota-global.com／investors／stock_information_ratings／outline.html.
２. Formulation of Japan’s Stewardship Code and“Stewardship Responsibility”
In February２０１４, Japan enacted a Stewardship Code that prescribed a set of prin-
ciples governing the actions of institutional investors. They include constructive engagement
with companies and voting. This code“defines principles considered to be helpful for institu-
tional investors who behave as responsible institutional investors in fulfilling their steward-
ship responsibilities with due regard both to their clients and beneficiaries and to investee
companies.”２
What are“stewardship responsibilities”？ They“refer to the responsibilities of in-
２ The Council of Experts Concerning the Japanese Version of the Stewardship Code（２０１４）, P１.
―― 経 営 論 集 ――２４４
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Figure ３ Levels of Engagement by Institutional Investors
（Source）Winter（２０１１）, P１２.
stitutional investors to enhance the medium- to long-term investment return for their clients
and beneficiaries（including ultimate beneficiaries; the same shall apply hereafter）by im-
proving and fostering the investee companies’corporate value and sustainable growth
through constructive engagement, or purposeful dialogue, based on in-depth knowledge of
the companies and their business environment.”３
Winter（２０１１）states that“the stewardship variant of engagement goes yet fur-
ther. In that variant the engagement is structural, not limited in time or to a certain prob-
lem. The structural engagement is in fact there to add value to the investment in the long
term; it is the crux of a different way of investing. Shares are held for longer periods and
success is determined on a long-term basis. Not continuously using the exit option that the
market offers requires greater involvement of the investor in the company, more under-
standing, more information, and exercising more influence to protect and increase the value
of the investment.”４
The reason why Japan’s Stewardship Code requests“stewardship responsibility”is
because institutional investors have a significant impact on the investee companies. In the
current Japanese stock market, foreign institutional investors account for more than ３０%.
However, the number of Japanese institutional investors is also growing.
Using financial data, Iwatsubo and Sotoki（２００７）and Miyajima and Hoda（２０１５）
３ Id.
４ Winter（２０１１）, P１２.
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Figure ４ Comparison between Universe and Sample
Classification
Relative Frequency
Universe Sample
Asset Manager
Investment managers １４１ ７２．７% ２２ ７３．３%
Trust banks ７ ３．６% ２ ６．７%
Asset Owner
Pension funds ２４ １２．４% ５ １６．７%
Insurance companies ２２ １１．３% １ ３．３%
Total １９４ １００% ３０ １００%
（Note）Investigation period: January２０１６-March２０１６
Collection rate:１８．５%
clarified that both foreign and Japanese investors affect corporate value and performance.
However, it is unknown if this influence results from engagement, voting activities, or other
reasons.
The present study reveals institutional investors’activities through published vot-
ing data and the results of questionnaires from institutional investors who accepted Japan’s
Stewardship Code and suggests that these investors foster the investee companies’corpo-
rate value and sustainable growth through constructive engagement, voting, or purposeful
dialogue.
３. Flow of Voting Activities and Voting Records of Real Investors
Voting activity is one method by which institutional investors affect investee com-
panies. They need to vote properly to fulfill their stewardship responsibility. It is imperative
that we know who sets the voting policy and votes on shareholder measures because securi-
ties filings identify Japan Trustee Services Bank and The Master Trust Bank of Japan as
the major shareholders. The study investigated the voting method and the dialogue process
when institutional investors entrust administration by submitting a questionnaire to institu-
tional investors who had accepted Japan’s Stewardship Code.
This questionnaire surveyed １９４ institutional investors who had accepted Japan’s
Stewardship Code. A total of １６２ candidates were surveyed in Japan; ３２ candidates, whose
headquarters were overseas, were not subjected to the survey. Of the １６２ candidates sur-
veyed in Japan,３０institutional investors responded.
―― 経 営 論 集 ――２４６
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Figure ５ Flow of Voting Activities and the Investment Chain
（Source）Kitagawa（２０１５）, P１; Oguchi（２０１６）.
First, the questionnaire investigated how institutional investors manage and admin-
ister stocks and exercise their voting. Many asset owners（e.g., pension funds）entrust their
asset management and votes. Asset managers judge bills based on the voting policy that
the asset owners have. Sometimes asset managers refer to the opinions of service providers.
Many asset managers deliver yeas and nays to SAABs, and they complete the vot-
ing forms and votes. Although many asset owners entrust their voting activities to asset
managers, they check if the trustees judge each bill properly.
Figure６ displays the voting records of institutional investors who adopted Japan’s
Stewardship Code in ２０１４ and ２０１５. On average, １１．９１% and １０．３６%, respectively, of the
votes cast dissented to the approval of a proposed measure.
Many institutional investors cast dissenting votes in２０１４and２０１５. One way to as-
sess whether this percentage is high is to compare it with the dissenting votes during the
era when silent partners with extensive cross-shareholdings were the largest group of Japa-
nese shareholders. Unfortunately, there is lack of data on past voting records. However, al-
most all shareholder meetings during that era were concluded within３０minutes, so we can
infer that few dissenting votes were cast. Compared with that era, １１．９１% and１０．３６% dis-
―― Changes in Ownership Structure and Real Investors ―― ２４７
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Figure ６ Voting Records of Institutional Investors who Adopted Japan’s Stewardship Code
Bills
Fiscal year ２０１４ Fiscal year ２０１５
Affirmative
Vote
Dissenting
Vote
Abstention
Affirmative
Vote
Dissenting
Vote
Abstention
Appropriation of retained earnings ９６．２９% ３．６４% ０．０７% ９５．９４% ４．０３% ０．０２%
Appointment of board members ９０．１３% ９．８０% ０．０７% ９０．１５% ９．８１% ０．０４%
Appointment of auditors ７７．５８% ２２．３５% ０．０７% ８４．４６% １５．５２% ０．０２%
Alteration of memorandum ９６．２４% ３．６７% ０．０９% ９５．０９% ４．８８% ０．０３%
Payment of retirement benefits ５７．６５% ４２．０２% ０．３３% ５５．１０% ４４．８３% ０．０７%
Revision of board members’com-
pensation
９３．５３% ６．０４% ０．４３% ９２．３０% ７．６７% ０．０３%
Issuance of stock acquisition rights ８１．３２% １８．２２% ０．４６% ８２．５２% １７．２４% ０．２４%
Appointment of accountant auditors ９７．２１% ２．７９% ０．００% ９８．６７% ０．８３% ０．５０%
Category of restructuring ９１．２３% ８．７７% ０．００% ９７．４１% ２．５９% ０．００%
Takeover defense ５０．８５% ４９．１５% ０．００% ５０．３９% ４９．６１% ０．００%
The others ５９．４９% ４０．４２% ０．０９% ７７．９４% ２２．０５% ０．０１%
Total ８８．０５% １１．９１% ０．０５% ８９．５６% １０．３６% ０．０７%
（Notes）１. Aggregate votes at shareholder meetings in May or June２０１４and２０１５.
２.“Category of restructuring”includes mergers, transfers, or acquisitions of businesses, stock swaps,
equity transfers, and corporate divestitures.
３.“Other measures”include acquiring treasury stock, reducing legal reserves, allocating new shares
to a third party, reducing capital, and approving reverse stock splits.
（Source）Voting records of each institution.
senting votes appear quite substantial.
These figures indicate that the higher percentage of dissenting votes was a result
of takeover defenses, payment of retirement benefits, and other measures. The category
“other measures”includes acquiring treasury stock, reducing legal reserves, allocating new
shares to third parties, reducing capital, and approving reverse stock splits. Institutional in-
vestors apparently followed guidelines to vote against measures that might impair share-
holder returns. Both foreign investors and Japanese institutional investors exercise voting
rights.
―― 経 営 論 集 ――２４８
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Figure ７ Investment Assets and Portfolio Allocation of GPIF
（Source）GPIF home page, http:／／www.gpif.go.jp／en／.
４. Voting Record of GPIF
Within these real investors, public institutions, the Government Pension Investment
Fund（GPIF）, and the Bank of Japan have several domestic stocks. GPIF is Japan’s largest
public pension. The role of GPIF is that it“shall manage and invest the Reserve Funds of
the Government Pension Plans entrusted by the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare,
and shall contribute to the financial stability of both Plans by remitting profits of investment
to the Special Accounts for the Government Pension Plans.”５
In ２０１４, GPIF changed the policy asset mix and bought many domestic equities
（Figure７）. In the current security market in Japan, the influence of public institutions is
growing. As discussed earlier, asset owners（GPIF）entrust their asset management and
votes. However, GPIF requested all the external asset managers of investment in domestic
equities to report their stewardship activities.
Figure８ shows the voting records of GPIF. GPIF also cast dissenting votes in２０１５
and２０１６. As much as ８．３% and ７．９% of the votes cast dissented to the approval of a pro-
posed measure.
５ GPIF home page, http:／／www.gpif.go.jp／en／about.
―― Changes in Ownership Structure and Real Investors ―― ２４９
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Figure ８ Voting Records of GPIF
Proposal
Fiscal year ２０１５
Fiscal year ２０１６
（From April to June）
Approved Opposed Approved Opposed
Proposal pertaining to com-
pany organization
Appointment of directors ９２．９% ７．１% ９３．２% ６．８%
External directors ８６．８% １３．２% ８９．６% １０．４%
Appointment of auditors ８５．４% １４．６% ８５．８% １４．２%
External directors ７９．２% ２０．８% ７９．２% ２０．８%
Appointment of
accounting auditors
１００．０% ０．０% ９９．６% ０．４%
Proposals pertaining to direc-
tor remuneration, etc.
Director remuneration ９７．５% ２．５% ９７．９% ２．１%
Director bonuses ９６．９% ３．１% ９６．８% ３．２%
Director retirement benefits ４４．８% ５５．２% ４４．８% ５５．２%
Granting of stock options ８１．１% １８．９% ８５．４% １４．６%
Proposals pertaining to capital
management（excluding items
pertaining to amendment of
the articles of incorporation）
Dividends ９６．１% ３．９% ９６．３% ３．７%
Acquisition of treasury
stock
１００．０% ０．０% １００．０% ０．０%
Mergers, acquisition, etc. ９８．２% １．８% ９８．７% １．３%
Proposals pertaining to amendment of
the articles of incorporation
９６．５% ３．５% ９７．０% ３．０%
Poison Pills（Rights plan）
Warning type ４６．５% ５３．５% ４３．７% ５６．３%
Trust-type ０．０% ０．０% ０．０% ０．０%
Other proposals ９４．０% ６．０% ８７．７% １２．３%
Total ９１．７% ８．３% ９２．１% ７．９%
（Source）GPIF home page, http:／／www.gpif.go.jp／en／.
５. Dialogues by Institutional Investors
One important activity that enhances the medium- to long-term investment returns
of institutional investors’clients and beneficiaries is dialogue. Situations that result in dia-
logues between institutional investors and investee companies were investigated.
As the result, four out of six institutions including insurance companies and those
with pension funds wholly entrusted the asset managers with the responsibility of holding
dialogues. Nevertheless, almost all investment managers and trust banks have dialogues
（Figure９）.
―― 経 営 論 集 ――２５０
／■修校了／１２－２８５／本文／ＡＺ２８５Ｎ 2018.03.13 14.38.54 Page 270
Figure ９ Situations of Dialogue
Options
Total
Investment managers
and trust banks
Pension funds and
insurance companies
Quantity of
responses
Rate
Quantity of
responses
Rate
Quantity of
responses
Rate
① Practice by（almost）all investee
companies
１３ ４４．８% １３ ５６．５% ０ ０%
② Practice by only poorly performing
investee companies
０ ０% ０ ０% ０ ０%
③ Practice by certain standard ９ ３１．０% ８ ３４．８% １ １７%
③―１ Investee companies
which could be concerned
about decrease shareholder
return
（e.g. low distribution, intro-
duction of takeover de-
fense）
３ ３３．３% ２ ２５．０% １ １００%
③―２Others ５ ５５．６% ５ ６２．５% ０ ０%
④Doesn’t practice dialogue on one’s
own
７ ２４．１% ２ ８．７% ５ ８３%
Cause
for
④―１ Judge based on voting
policy
１ １４．３% ０ ０% １ １７%
④―２ Leave entirely up to
asset managers
５ ７１．４% １ ４．３% ４ ６７%
④―３ Leave entirely up to
SAAB
０ ０% ０ ０% ０ ０%
④―４Others １ １４．３% １ ４．３% ０ ０%
Total ２９ １００% ２３ １００% ６ １００%
（Note）N ＝２９. As a non-response institution, the numbers of ③（９）and ③―１＋ ③―２（８）do not sum up.
“Certain Standard”pertains to investee companies concerned with decreasing
shareholder return（e.g., low distribution and introduction of takeover defense）or only ac-
tive management brands. As some studies indicate, passively managing brands while adher-
ing to Japan’s Stewardship Code is a challenge for institutional investors.
The rate and frequency of dialogue with investee companies were also studied
（Figure １０）. Institutional investors have dialogues with as few as one or two companies or
as many as a１，０００. The frequency of dialogues per company is as follows:
Six institutions hold one or two times per year（１７．６５%）
One institution holds two or three times per year（５．８８%）
―― Changes in Ownership Structure and Real Investors ―― ２５１
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Figure １０ Rates and Frequencies of Dialogues with Investee Companies
（ ）% of
all investee
companies
About （ ）
companies of
all investee
About（ ）times per one company, one year
① ～ １
time
② １～２
times
③ ２～３
times
④ ３～４
times
⑤４
times～
Average ５９．１% ３５０
Total ３ ６ １ ４ ３
Median ５５．０% １６５
（Note）N ＝１７. Counting only corresponds to institutions who responded.
Figure １１ Content of Dialogues
Options Average of the ranks
Confirmation of companies’situations（to catch up on their situ-
ation）
１．５８３３
Proposals of how to increase enterprise value or exercise IR ２．１３８９
Encouragement of changing management policy（e.g. low distri-
bution, introduction of purchase defense）
２．２７７８
（Notes）１. N ＝１７. Counting only corresponds to institutions who responded.
２.５% significance（Friedman test）.
Four institutions hold three or four times per year（２３．５３%）
Three institutions hold over four times per year（１７．６５%）
Although the frequency of dialogues depends on each institution, many Japanese in-
stitutional investors proactively have dialogues.
With regard to the content of the dialogues, there are three options ranked as follows:
① confirmation of companies’situations（to catch up on their situation; １．５８３３）; ②
proposals on how to increase enterprise value or exercise IR（２．１３８９）; and ③ promote
change of management policy（e.g., low distribution and introduction of takeover defense;
２．２７７８）（Figure１１）.
Principle３of Japan’s Stewardship Code states,“institutional investors should moni-
tor investee companies so that they can appropriately fulfill their stewardship responsibili-
ties with an orientation towards the sustainable growth of the companies.”６ Japanese institu-
tional investors intend to fulfill their stewardship responsibilities by monitoring companies’
situation.
６ The Council of Experts Concerning the Japanese Version of the Stewardship Code（２０１４）, P６.
―― 経 営 論 集 ――２５２
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６. Conclusion
The present study investigates the activities of the accounts managers monitored
by investee companies by checking the voting records and dialogues of institutions that fol-
low Japan’s Stewardship Code.
Not all real investors（institutional investors）cast affirmative votes for all meas-
ures irrespective of performance. Many institutional investors set guidelines for voting or
carefully examine each shareholder measure to fulfill their stewardship responsibilities. If as-
set owners entrust their management or administration, they（asset owners）engage with
trustees（asset managers）to decide on the vote in light of the results of the monitoring of
investee companies and dialogue with them. For example, GPIF requested all the external
asset managers of investment in domestic equities to report on their stewardship activities.
Although the frequency of dialogues depends on each institution, many Japanese in-
stitutional investors proactively have dialogues. Japanese institutional investors（real inves-
tors）have changed to engage with investee companies.
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